Shifting sands
Egyptian Researcher on Islamist Movements
عنوان البريد الإلكتروني هذا محمي من روبوتات السبام. يجب عليك تفعيل الجافاسكربت لرؤيته.
Recent events in Gaza have made it clear that Islamism is now the master of the moment. As an idea, as well as a political manifestation, Islamism occupied centre stage. The most active and influential components of the Palestinian resistance movement are now Islamist forces. Hamas and the Palestinian Jihad triggered the Israeli offensive and led Palestinian defence. Among political groups and movements to take part in protests are the Islamists that led and organised demonstrations. Even at the government level they are the strongest players. Think simply of Turkey's Justice and Development government.
Islamism, as an idea and movement, has spread throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds. The Arab cause is no longer, not only because Iran and Turkey have become major players in a political equation that was always Arab in identity, but also because the prevailing ideology of the cause is no longer Arabist. "Palestine is an Islamic stance", a motto contained in the Hamas charter, is among the most potent ideas the movement has given the Palestinian struggle. It has made it possible to transcend nationalist and Arab frameworks. And when war in Gaza struck, Islamism dominated not only banners but also the outlook that governed the logic of the struggle.
Observers noted how battle cries such as "Remember Kheibar, Jews!" were raised during protests, not only in the Islamic world but also on the streets of European capitals. Kheibar was a rich and fertile oasis north of Al-Madina inhabited by Jews and destroyed by Prophet Mohamed in 628. The implication, then, is that the battle is a fight for existence between Muslims and Jews and the only solution is jihad -- holy war. As for the appeal to the West, or parts of the West such as the human rights and relief agencies, it played solely on the theme that in the face of Zionist brutality one can only sympathise with and support the Palestinians. There was little interest in formulating a more substantial rhetoric in addressing the West.
The war in Gaza brought the Palestinian cause back to the Muslim Brothers as much as it brought them back to a cause which a new generation of members of the Muslim Brotherhood appeared less aware of than the group's founders. Historically, the Brotherhood was instrumental in raising the Palestinian cause in the Arab and Muslim consciousness. The movement's founder, Hassan El-Banna, rallied the resources of his organisation behind it. The early Muslim Brothers' Fire and Destruction in Palestine was the first book on the cause and, during the 1948 war, Muslim Brotherhood volunteers were the first to declare a jihad in Palestine. From the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood advocacy of the Palestinian cause spread to the rest of the Arab and Islamic world and to other ideological and political movements. Gamal Abdel-Nasser, and the revolutionary government he founded in July 1952, not only championed it but made it the heart of their project for Arab unity. Nasser, who together with a group of Free Officers, had once joined the Muslim Brotherhood society in the Egyptian army, can in some ways be said to be Hassan El-Banna's heir in championing the Palestinian cause despite his subsequent violent clash with the Muslim Brotherhood. The rise of the Fatah movement in the 1960s gave the Palestinian revolution another major boost. Its founders, too, had emerged from the Brotherhood's fold before the tide of Arab nationalism and the sweeping changes it brought.
As the Muslim Brotherhood became evermore preoccupied with its struggle with the regime Palestine moved from the centre to the periphery of its agenda. For new generations of Brothers, who lacked their predecessors' awareness of the cause, it was regarded as an unwelcome inheritance. The Gaza war would radically change that and bring Palestine back to the fore in the Brotherhood's consciousness.
It is possible, nevertheless, to observe some shades of difference within the Brotherhood as a whole. In the past, there was an understandable difference between the attitudes of Muslim Brothers in those countries bordering the Zionist entity and those more geographically removed. Today the discrepancies extend to frontline countries and are contingent upon circumstances within each.
Although the Muslim Brothers have come under heavy fire from the Baathist regime in Syria, Damascus is allied with Hamas and hosts the group's senior leaders. The war in Gaza thus provided an occasion for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to declare a truce with the regime. They were keen not to make things awkward for their Hamas brothers, but the war also came as an opportunity for the Syrian Muslim Brothers to catch a much needed breath after their defeat in the latest round of conflict with the regime.
In Lebanon Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya (The Islamic Group) -- once again and in a spontaneous manner -- moved to reposition itself in the domestic political equation on the basis of the stance towards Palestine. In spite of sectarian tensions the Lebanese offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood found itself drawing closer to Hizbullah, regardless of the residual bitterness from the aftermath of the invasion of Beirut. Jamaa drew away from the Mustaqbal (Future) Movement, which had sided against Hamas on the grounds that it was part of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, but the distancing proved only temporary. Approaching Lebanese elections dictated a rapprochement between the Islamic Group and Mustaqbal, however cool.
In Jordan the voice of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Gaza crisis was louder than anticipated. Working in their favour was the fact that the position of the public coincided with that of the government, which allowed the former to vent anger in the streets in the absence of any other course of action. The Jordanian Muslim Brothers escalated their rhetoric in support of Hamas and their own movement, which had long served as fodder to question their loyalty to the regime, without pausing to consider the bill they would pay after the smoke on the battlefront cleared.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's return to the Palestinian cause has occurred against an unfavourable background as Egypt's regime presents itself as leading the "moderate" project in the region. The Brothers' struggle with the regime complicated the matter even further regarding Hamas which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and at the same time a Palestinian national liberation movement.
The Muslim Brothers returned to the Palestinian cause but the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer what it was when it first raised the Palestinian banner. At times their expressions of solidarity seemed like a dare, at others they had the air of a desperate act. Never did their actions appear commensurate with the historical challenge facing the Palestinian cause or the duty demanded by their relationship with Hamas, the Brotherhood's project in Palestine.
The Gaza war had an impact on the Salafist movement. It pushed their political capacities to the limit and simultaneously triggered a kind of filtering process that brought to the fore different trends within a movement that had until recently been regarded as a monolithic entity.
Some portions of the Salafist movement rediscovered political energy. The Kuwaiti Salafists -- the keenest on political action -- took to the streets to protest. They availed themselves of methods -- mass rallies and parliamentary protests -- normally scorned in Salafist circles.
Many Saudi Arabian Salafists followed suit. There were signed statements and proclamations in which Salafist placed their names alongside those of prominent Islamists whom they had previously condemned as heretics. In one declaration, leading Saudi Salafists appeared side by side with such major Islamist thinkers as Mohamed Amara, long regarded as a secular Trojan horse in the Islamic camp.
Although Egypt's Salafists are generally keen to keep politics and public activity at arm's length, during the Gaza offensive the Egyptian Salafist school (whose main base is in Alexandria) revealed its activist side. They regarded the war as an "Islamic national cause" that could not be ignored and that transcended any ideological differences between Islamists. Their support for Hamas, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was unequivocal.
There is no need to focus on the substance of Salafist rhetoric on Gaza. It was conventional and of little import in general. What is significant, though, is that Salafists felt compelled to reprioritise their agenda in accordance with events. Salafist satellite channels switched their entire programming around in order to give precedence to the war on Gaza. Anyone familiar with the ability of the Salafist preaching to float above, and sometimes in the opposite direction, of people's concerns, will appreciate the magnitude of the impact of the war in Gaza on this trend. It was not that long ago that prominent figures from this school expressed their scorn for the politics of resistance. Such voices have since been muffled.
Another discrepancy in the Salafist trend manifested itself in the form of the isolation of the official Salafi order from other shades in the Salafist spectrum. It had to wait until it knew the position of the regime until it declared its own position. It was not until five days after the war broke out that Saudi Arabia's official Wahabi clergy made their voice heard in a statement that said everything and nothing, stressing above all the need to maintain public order. When some of its representatives attempted to counter popular Islamist expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian cause (as occurred when Saleh Al-Lahidan issued a fatwa declaring demonstrations a heresy) they were greeted with criticism even within Salafist circles.
The Jihadist Salafist movement, as exemplified by Al-Qaeda, found itself on the Islamist fringe during the Gaza crisis. It was marginal in its presence and in its influence, having received little attention from the protesting public. Some of its members were obsessed with concerns other than the demands of the moment, as was the case with Abu Mohamed Al-Muqaddasi, inclined to criticise Hamas ideologically instead of supporting it. Even the most politically astute, such as Ayman El-Zawahri, proved unable to move beyond Al-Muqaddasi's dogmatism. Intentionally or not, he conspicuously missed the chance to express solidarity with Hamas and Palestinian resistance forces, forfeiting any opportunity to give Al-Qaeda a foothold in Palestine.
Gaza also shed light on the new preachers. It was a full week before the most prominent new- age Islamist, Amr Khaled, made his voice heard. When he did speak he managed to depoliticise an issue that is inherently political, his perspective proceeding not from the logic of resistance but rather from one of civil action within the context of international conditions unfavourable to Islam and Muslims. He preferred "peaceful" action and felt greater progress would be made through community efforts aimed at promoting awareness- raising activities addressed to the West on the basis of a common platform of human rights advocacy.
This trend, which seems to lack any solid theological authority, tends to have its sights trained more on the West and seeks to establish itself within a more universal frame of reference. Its rhetoric, therefore, contains no references to jihad or martyrdom and its methods of appeal -- through Facebook, the satellite channels, e-mail fliers -- are more in tune with the secular world.
Al-Ahram Weekly
Issue No. 935